Abstract-Content-Based Publish/Subscribe (CBPS) is an interaction if it believes that some brokers could re-sell or otherwise model where the interests of subscribers are stored in a content-based forexploit this information. warding infrastructure to guide routing of notifications to interested par-Subscription confidentiality: Subscribers would like to keep ties. In this paper, we focus on answering the following question: Can we implement content-based publish/subscribe while keeping subscriptions their stock quote subscriptions private from the forwarding and notifications confidential from the forwarding brokers? Our contribrokers, as these might leak their business strategy.
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butions include a systematic analysis of the problem, providing a formal security model and showing that the maximum level of attainable security Creating solutions to deal with these aspects iS paramount if in this setting is restricted. We focus on enabling provable confidentiality CBPS is to be adopted as a solution for data dissemination. for commonly used applications and subscription languages in CBPS and However, the very nature of CBPS targeting a sweet spot present a series of practical provably secure protocols, some of which are in the space of plain IP-multicast (when subscribers can be novel and others adapted from existing work. We have implemented these protocols in SIENA, a popular CBPS system. Evaluation results show that clustered into groups based on their topic interests), broadcast confidential content-based publish/subscribe is practical: A single broker (when most subscribers want most ofthe data) or simple unicast serving 1000 subscribers is able to route more than 100 notifications per (if few subscribers are interested in even fewer data) makes second with our solutions.
secnd ithou soutins solutions quite difficult to obtain, as they must meet strict perIndex Terms-confidentiality, content-based publish/subscribe, privacy-soluto n equited ts to otait strictuperpreserving range matches formance requirements and tght security guarantees.
In this paper, we provide a thorough study of confidentiality in the context of content-based forwarding and present our I. INTRODUCTION solution, being the first work to fully address this issue. The CONTENT-BASED publish/subscribe (CBPS) is a conve-contributions of this paper include nient interaction model for distributed systems, allowing 1 . a formal definition and a systematic analysis of confidendecoupled messaging through the CBPS infrastructure between tiality in CBPS; two types of actors: (1) subscribers, having interests in informa-2. several provably secure techniques, either novel or newly tion they express as subscriptions, and (2) publishers, producadapted from existing work, that enable Confidential ing information of interest as notifications. A network of CBPS Content-Based Publish/Subscribe (C-CBPS) for combrokers provides a decentralized infrastructure whose role is to monly used types of subscriptions and notifications; and disseminate notifications efficiently from the publishers to all 3. an implementation of our solutions in a popular CBPS the subscribers that have matching interests, optimizing aspects system, SIENA [1] , making available to the community like bandwidth usage or end-to-end latency.
the first complete implementation ofpublish/subscribe that Research in the publish/subscribe area has traditionally fosupports confidentiality. Evaluation results prove that our cused on the scalability issues of publish/subscribe networks, solutions are lightweight enough to be suitable for usage in yielding distributed algorithms for wide-area event notification real applications. and matching by using infrastructures comprising a mesh of The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides backpublish/subscribe brokers [ 1, 2] . An implicit assumption under-ground information. Section III presents our definition of the lying this research has been that the forwarding brokers must Confidential CBPS problem and also discusses inherent limibe trusted with subscription and notification information to per-tations. In Section IV we present our solutions for Confidenform correct content-based matching. This is only acceptable tial CBPS. Section V discusses how these protocols are bundled for interactions between a large number of publishers and sub-CBPS. Although the latter reduces the decoupling provided by scribers, scattered spatially across the entire Internet.
CBPS (as publishers and subscribers must use an auxiliary disSubscribers have the ability to express their interest in an tribution channel for the common secret), it is central to preevent by sending a subscription to an infrastructure compris-serving confidentiality. The group key distribution problem has ing a decentralized network of publish/subscribe brokers. The been studied intensely in the literature, with several solutions infrastructure delivers to the subscribers any published notifi-available [7] . Here, we treat the key distribution problem as cation that matches their registered interests. In content-based orthogonal to this work. publish/subscribe, the subscription is a predicate containing one Preventing a malicious subscriber from disseminating all the or more constraints orfilters on the attributes of notifications, information it receives to other parties is equivalent to solving with each filter applying to a single attribute. An event notifica-the digital copyright problem. This is also outside the scope of tion is a set of attributes, where an attribute is a triple: (name, this work. type, value) [1] .
We assume that brokers are computationally bounded and do The commonly used example is stock quotes dissemination, not deviate from the content-based forwarding protocol they where the event notification contains attributes such as subject correctly forward notifications to interested subscribers. Other-(string, the name of the event), exchange (string, the name of wise, denial of service attacks could be mounted easily (since the stock exchange), symbol (string, for example DIS), price brokers could simply drop messages), affecting the correct op-(float, the current value of the specified stock) and change (float, eration of the infrastructure. We do not consider the effects of the variation of price with respect to the previous value). An this type of behavior, leaving it as an issue for future research. example subscription is (change> 0) and (symbol= "DIS").
The main task of the CBPS broker is to match a notifica-B. Problem Definition tion against the subscriptions it stores, determining which sub-
Pubscribers should receive the notification. Subscription S is said lish/Subscribe (C-CBPS). Consider two types of parties to cover S2 if the set of notifications matched by S2 is a subset P (publishers) and S (subscribers) having private inputs. Each of those matched by Si [1] . CBPS systems use the covering Pi has a sequence of notifications, and each Sj has some relation between subscriptions to ensure a sublinear increase of information interests (filters or subscriptions), a subset of broker matching time with the number of stored subscriptions. which is active at any point in time. C-CBPS is a multi-round protocol between P,S and a third party R, the broker. In each B. Security Preliminaries round one of the following can take place: a) Sj (for some
We say that a function f is negligible in t if, for any polyno-j) sends its active filters to R; or b) Pi (for some i) sends a mial p there exists to such that for all t > to, f (t) < 1/p(t). We notification to R. A correct implementation of C-CBPS with use PPT as a shorthand for probabilistic polynomial time.
security parameter t must satisfy the following: We provide the following standard definitions from the litera-Correctness R must be able to determine in PPT the subset of ture on provable security [6] , which we will use throughout this active filters that matches each notification. paper.
Security For k C N, define Viewk as all the communicaPseudorandom Function. A pseudorandom function is comtions R has received from P and S before round k. We assume that the publishers and subscribers are trustworable, the only thing that is leaked is whether a notification thy and that they share a common secret used for confidential matches the subscription or not. The notifications that are not matched by the available subscriptions are computa-tions arise from the functionality the broker is required to pertionally indistinguishable from random bits.
form (i.e., to decide if an encrypted subscription matches an enSubscription Security Subscriptions can be distinguished us-crypted notification) and are inherent to the C-CBPS problem.
ing the covering relation, and therefore their encryption Here, we present a brief overview of these limitations. scheme is not semantically secure. A stronger security model could require that the subscription encryption C.1 The Attack at Dawn Problem scheme is also semantically secure. In this paper we dis-
The mere fact that a subscription matches a notification can card this stronger model for practical purposes: efficient leak crucial information, if the identities of the publishers and CBPS solutions rely on the coverage relation between sub-subscribers are known to the broker. An (admitedly contrived) scriptions, which mandates that a broker should know if example is this: The army has several operational units that regtwo subscriptions are related [8] .
ister subscriptions to receive specific commands, such as "attack Subscriptions stored by a broker can be used to distinguish messages seen at the broker that cannot be computed by certain notifications (e.g., to tell if they are equal) by matchapplying match and cover (using an oracle) to the indexes ing the subscriptions against the notification: this uses the fact of subscriptions and notifications. that the broker must be able to match subscriptions against noThe definition above can be generalized naturally to the multi-tifications, and is independent of the encryption scheme used broker case where the number of forwarding brokers is arbitrar-for notifications. The more subscriptions that are available, the ily large.
more likely the broker is to accurately distinguish notifications.
Any solution for confidential CBPS consists of the following In the case where the broker has a complete basis of subscripfive algorithms (the first 4 are compulsory for correct C-CBPS, tions, it can distinguish all notifications with zero probability of the last one may be provided for efficiency):
error. Keygen(t): run jointly by the publishers and subscribers, outputs the shared private key K when given the security pa-C.3 Confidentiality-Generality Tradeoff rameter t as input
We define the "complexity" of a subscription type as 1
IndexSub(K,S): runbythesubscribero"omplexitytsubscripionptype mins, ndexSub(K,S): run by the subscriber, outputs the encrypted where mins is the minimal number of subscriptions needed subscription Se when given the plaintext subscription S to recognize all notifications. There is a direct correlation beand the private key K tween the complexity of a subscription and the information it IndexNot(K,N): run by the publisher, outputs the encrypted leaks about notifications. For instance, the simplest subscripnotification Ne when given the notification S and the pri-tion function is equality testing: one such subscription will alvate key K low a broker to distinguish notifications that are equal to the Match(Ne,Se): run by the broker, receives as parameters an specified value. To distinguish all possible notifications withencrypted notification Ne and an encrypted subscription out error (i.e., to have a basis), the broker needs 0(2 n) distinct Se and outputs 1 if Se matches Ne or 0 otherwise subscriptions, where n is the size of the notification in bits. The
Cover(Sei ,Se2 ): (Optional) run by the broker, accepts as para-more complex subscriptions are, the more information is leaked meters two encrypted subscriptions Se1 and Se2, and out-about notifications. For instance, a subscription that accepts all puts 1 if Sei covers Se2 or 0 otherwise notifications with the kth bit set to a specific value, will allow For simplicity of exposition, we use the term "encrypt" to de-the broker to distinguish information about the k th bit of all nonote a secure encoding of subscriptions and notifications that tifications. In this case, only 0(n) subscriptions are needed to allows C-CBPS. However, we point out that the schemes pre-distinguish notifications with zero probability of error. sented here are not traditional symmetric encryption schemes, since decryption is not usually possible.
C.4 Trust
The assumption that any individual in the potentially large C. Limitations of Confidentiality group of publishers and subscribers is trusted is strong: If a Regardless of the protocols used, the maximum level of at-single subscriber leaks the secret key to the brokers, then the tamnable confidentiality in CBPS is quite limited. These limita-security of the protocol is compromised.
In the single key setting, detecting the source of information IndexNot(K,N): select rnd uniformly at random. Let h = leakage is very difficult, and so is excluding malicious sub-FK (N). Return (rnd, Fh (rnd) ). scribers from the network. Broadcast Encryption [11] is used Match(Ne,Se): Let Ne = (rnd, two). Return There are two high level approaches to solving C-CBPS: one way is to encrypt notifications as a whole and match them B against the encrypted subscription. This approach requires supSubstring matching is the most expressive operation currently port for complex subscriptions appearing in practice, which are implemented on strings in common CBPS architectures. We difficult to support efficiently and securely in the same time, as choose to support a simpler operation keyword matchingwe show in Section IV.D.
based on the observation that this suffices for many applications. The alternative approach, used in this paper, relies on the The protocol we use has been proposed by Goh [13] . The idea is structure of notifications (which are collections of attribute-to break the string into words and construct a Bloom filter [14] value pairs). This allows us to support overall complex sub-to signal existence of a word in the string. The subscription is a scriptions that are composed from several simpler building single keyword. blocks. The security of this compound protocol is weaker than Let F be a pseudorandom function. Let BF be a Bloom filter. Definition 1, even though the basic building blocks are secure. The algorithms for Keyword C-CBPS (Goh [13] ) are: However, through careful selection ofthe attributes that the bro-Keygen(t): select r as the number of hash functions in the ker is allowed to "match", the amount of leaked information can Bloom filter BF with the desired false positive rate. Select be controlled and should be acceptable in practical cases. Obvi- exists i such that BF[yi] = 0 return 0, otherwise return 1 In the descriptions of the basic C-CBPS schemes, we assume Cover(S1,S2): Return 1 if S1 = S2, 0 otherwise. each notification is a single value, and each subscription is a We make the assumption that all strings have a predefined single filter. length and that they have the same number of words. This prevents an attacker from distinguishing two notifications by A. Equality Filtering counting the number of bits set in the BF. When the latter One of the prominent filtering functions used in practice is assumption does not hold, we can add random bits to the BF to equality matching. To support equality matches, we use the simulate the proper number of words [13] . first step of the solution proposed by Song et al. for searches Theorem 2: Keyword is a correct implementation of Con encrypted data [12] . The idea is to compute the "hidden" CBPS. value of an attribute by passing its plaintext value as argu-A proof sketch is presented in the Appendix. ment to a pseudorandom function, keyed with the secret key.
The overhead of the protocol mainly lies in transmitting the The encrypted subscription is the hidden value of the plaintext. Bloom filter, which can be as large as the size of the string, if Encrypted notifications are composed of two parts: a random all the words are included as possible keywords. nonce r, generated by the publisher, and the result of feeding r Alternative Schemes. Other solutions are available for keyto a pseudorandom function, keyed with the hidden value of the word filtering [12, 15, 16] . The scheme proposed by Chang et notification's plaintext. al. [15] is based on creating a dictionary that has one bit for Let F be a pseudorandom function. The algorithms for Equal every possible word in the string. The dictionary is shuffled us-C-CBPS are: ing a pseudorandom permutation and blinded using pseudoranKeygen(t): select K from {0,1}t uniformly at random dom functions and a random nonce. The notification includes IndexSub(K,S): return FK (5) the blinded dictionary, along with the random nonce.The subscription contains the shuffled index ofthe word plus a "hidden" scheme we have previously described. The Inequality scheme version of the index. is: Let F, G be two pseudorandom functions and E be a pseudo-Keygen(r): K = Dictionary.Keygen(r). Agree on a set of I random permutation. The Dictionary scheme is: reference points P1, . . . ,Pi C D. Keygen(t): select K ={K1, K2} uniformly at random from IndexSub(K,S): Let S= (type, value), where type can 0O,l}t x {0,l}t. Theorem 4: Suppose all subscriptions can be expressed exTheorem 3: Dictionary is a correct implementation of C-actly using the mechanisms above. Then, Inequality is a correct CBPS.
implementation of C-CBPS. A proof sketch is presented in the Appendix.
A proof sketch is presented in the Appendix. Compared to Keyword, Dictionary does not generate false
The overhead of this scheme is due to the size of the dicpositive matches and does not impose any restrictions on the tionary, equal to 2 1. There is a direct tradeoff between this number of words in the document. However, the size of the overhead and the precision it allows for subscriptions. If we want perfect subscriptions (0 false positive and negbeing very expensive for small documents. The expected size ative matches), we set I = |D|. This can be expensive in reof string attributes in CBPS is quite small (hundreds of bytes ality (e.g., for 4 byte integers we have -109 points). We deusually) favoring the first scheme. Dictionary can be used when scribe an exponentially spaced partitioning scheme that is usethe size ofthe string is larger or comparable to 32kB or in cases ful in many practical scenarios. points is only 100 (the notification has only 12 bytes), the preFiltering numeric attributes is frequent in practice and is con-cision is acceptable if we consider that subscriber sensitivity sequently supported by most implementations of content-based decreases as notification values increase. publish/subscribe. Let D c R be the notification space. Given a notification N C D, the subscription can have two forms: a) in-C.2 Supporting Range Subscriptions equality tests (N> lb, N < ub) or b) range tests (lb N< Ub), To support lb < Ub subscriptions, our initial idea was to for lb, Ube D. We define two novel C-CBPS schemes for the have the publishers and subscribers a-priori agree on a partitiontwo cases.
ing P = {p1, .. . , pi} of D. The publisher encrypts the index of These two protocols, despite being presented in the context the subset N belongs to by using Equal. The subscribers inof C-CBPS, have wider applicability. In particular, they can be clude as subscriptions encrypted versions of the indexes of the used for privacy preserving range matches: let the CBPS bro-subsets in the partition they are interested in (i.e., all pi e P ker be a public filestore and assume one user (publisher) stores such that pi n (lb, Ub) #4 0). However, sending multiple subsets some files, including metadata such as file size. The same user leaks more information than necessary. Therefore, we would can then send a query (i.e. a subscription) to the server request-have to approximate the subscription with a single subset in ing files that have the size bounded by some constraints; using the partition. This is not very precise since subscription sizes this special instance of C-CBPS, the fileserver can figure out (Ub -lb) andlbvary among subscribers. which files he should return without finding ouy anything more
The initial idea can be refined as follows. Create several partithan necessary.
tions of D, P1,..., Pm, with different subset sizes and different starting offsets. Create a dictionary containing as words the index of the partition concatenated with the subset index, for all Choose I points, p1, ... ,pi C D as reference points. We con-m partitions. A notification can be expressed as a document sider the following dictionary: {"> P1", "> P2", *. ., "> Pl" with this dictionary by listing the subsets it is included in. The "< P1", "< P2", , "< Pl"}. Subscriptions will be approx-subscription is approximated with one of the subsets in these imated with one of these constraints. Each notification N is partitions. The Range scheme is: considered to be a document containing the words in the dictio-Keygen(m): Generate K using Dictionary.Keygen. Agree nary that it matches. These are encrypted using the Dictionary on m partitions of D, Ri, P2, ... ,: Pm, where Pi Pi,1 U Pi,2 ... U Pi,l,. Let Pi,j = [aij, bijI At one end of the solution space, the minimum amount of inIndexSub(K,S): Let S = (lb, Ub). Find the best approxima-formation is revealed and communication size is very expensive. tion of S in PR,..., Pm. In particular, find x and y such Consider an enumeration of all functions from D -> {0, 1}. The that lb -ax,yl + Ub -bx,yl= min'1 minm 1 ( lb -aij + dictionary will contain the indexes of all these functions. We Ub -i |). Return Dictionary. IndexSub ("x, y") use Dictionary to encode arbitrary subscriptions by encrypting We chose SIENA due to its popularity and widespread adopof the notifications. In this case, given a (non-zero) desired false tion within the research community. Our algorithms can be emmatch rate, the size of the proper partitioning does not depend bedded easily in other CBPS solutions (such as Gryphon [2] or on D For instance, in the Evaluation section, we use a parti-Elvin [19] ). tioning scheme that yields for a uniform distribution of notifications 500 false matches (out of the 5%-10%) accepted by the A. The High-Level MatchingAlgorithm subscription) and contains only 890 words in the dictionary. SIENA notifications are attribute-value pairs. We treat atIn general, given a desired cost, choosing the proper partition-tribute values as confidential data that will be encrypted using ing is application specific and should take into consideration the one of the C-CBPS schemes described previously. The publishdistributions of subscriptions and notifications. An algorithm ers control which attributes can be "matched" and the schemes that determines the optimal partitioning strategy for a specifi-that can be used for matching. Subscriptions comprise one or cied cost is presented by Hore et al. [17] There is a tradeoff between the amount of information leaked Assume one subscriber wishes to receive all stock quotes to the brokers and the communication overhead. Therefore, to with (change > 0) and (symbo="DIS"). The subscriber will support generic subscriptions we can trade confidentiality for generate the following encrypted version: (name="change", communication efficiency.
scheme="Inequality", filter =Inequality.IndexSub (Ki,> 0)) and ( name = "symbol", scheme= "Equal", filter= match the hint of one subscription against any other subscripEqual. IndexSub (Ke,"DIS")). tions even in the case when the subscriptions have different Consider the notification containing (change=10, sym-types (and therefore cannot cover each other). We explore the bol="DIS", exchange="NYSE"). Its encrypted version has two performance benefits of covering in the Evaluation section. parts:
Range. The solution is to add encrypted versions ofthe approxMatchable Part is (name="change", scheme imate bounds (i.e., a,,y and b,,y) to the subscription.
"Inequality ",value*Inequality. IndexNot (Ki0)),
The covering algorithm is: return Range.Match (S1,S2.a) (name="symbol",scheme= "Equal ",value=Equal.
and Range.Match (S1,S2.b). This scheme has higher subscripIndexNot(Ke,"DIS")) tion overhead. The scheme allows a broker to independently
Payload is an encryption ofthe whole notification using a sym-check whether the margins (a and b) of one subscription are conmetric encryption scheme.
tamned by the other, which is more than knowing the coverage When the broker receives a notification, it iterates all the sub-relation. We evaluate the performance benefit of this scheme in scriptions it stores and performs the following steps: the Evaluation section. 1. For each attribute in the subscription it looks for an attribute with the same name in the matchable part of the no-D. Key Management tification, that has been encrypted using the same encryption scheme. If there exists an attribute in the subscription Each attribute has one or a few supported subscription types. not present in the notification, the result of the match is 0. The schemes we have presented assume that a secret key will 2. For each attribute-filter pair with matching names and be generated for each of these. Clearly, this does not scale well schemes it calls the corresponding Match algorithm, pass-with the number of searchable attributes. ing the value andfilter as parameters.
To circumvent this, we use a master key and a pseudoran-3. If all filters in the subscription match the corresponding dom function to generate a key for a given attribute name, type attributes in the notification, the result is 1. Otherwise, the (int, string), and encryption scheme (Range). This is achieved result is 0.
by keying the pseudorandom function with the master key and 4. Upon a true match, the broker sends the payload to the applying it to the string obtained by concatenating the attribute subscriber(s), if the latter is directly connected to the bro-name, type and the name of C-CBPS scheme. Each combinaker. Otherwise, it forwards the entire notification to the tion of attribute name, type and C-CBPS scheme will thus have broker(s) closer to the subscriber(s). its own key which will be used for C-CBPS. The security of any single C-CBPS scheme holds under computational assump-B. Implementation Notes tions. Furthermore, if any of these derived keys is leaked, the Generally, we tried to keep modifications to the existing information available to an attacker is minimal: it is infeasible SIENA code minimal to allow backward compatibility and easy for an adversary to retrieve the "master" key, even if the name integration with deployed solutions. We created encryptedfil-of the attribute, the type and C-CBPS scheme are known. ters, a new type of filter, that contains, besides the attribute name, a serialization of the encrypted subscription, encoded either using one of the schemes described in the previous section.
This section compares the performance of our solutions An encrypted matcher manager keeps track of supported en-against plaintext filtering. The results show that the overcryption formats and makes sure that notifications are matched head imposed on the brokers and the network for confidential against subscriptions only if they have been encrypted in the content-based forwarding is acceptable, making the solutions same way.
practical. We used the SHA-256 cryptographic hash function [20] throughout our implementation as a pseudorandom function. A. Evaluation Methodology for the symmetric encryption scheme All the data used for testing is synthetic, being generated uniand as a pseudorandom permutation.
formly at random or using the power law distribution. In all C. Subscrition Covering the tests, a single instance ofthe enhanced SIENA matching engine was evaluated. All experiments were run on a 1.7Ghz Intel Exploiting the covering relation between subscriptions in-Centrino Processor with 1Gb of RAM running Windows XP creases matching performance. We now discuss howto enable and Sun's JDK 1.5. Time is measured by using the function full subscription covering for Inequality and Range and what System.nanoTimeo available in Java 1.5. All the measurements information this leaks.
were repeated to obtain a standard error of at most 1% of the Inequality. Add a hint to every subscription, which has two measured value. parts: a) the result of applying Inequality.IndexNot to the Matching time is measured as the time the broker spends to threshold value and b) a deterministic encryption of the type identify the set of matching subscribers, when presented with a (i.e., "<" or ">").
notification. We define the reference matching time as the averThe covering algorithm is to return 0 if Si.hint.type age matching time required to match a notification against 1000 C2.hiIt.type.
Otherwise, return Inequality.Match (Si, subscriptions . Subscription and notification sizes are measured S2.himt.threshold). Clearly, this scheme has some overhead in terms oftotal network bytes sent, including SIENA'S protocol due to larger subscriptions. The scheme allows a broker to overhead. Keyword 364 704 tiple notifications (which is a necessity in publish/subscribe). For instance, the information-theoretically secure protocol described by Ishai [23] can be broken easily when used for multiKeyword is slightly faster than plaintext substring matching.
ple messages, while the semantically secure protocol described We notice that matching time ofKeyword is quite good when by Feige [22] becomes as secure as the one time pad in the same compared to the simpler Equal. Although Keyword has worse context. In theory, we can use such single message protocols base performance (5 times as as slow as Equal), higher subscrip-in the context of publish/subscribe, but with tremendous overtion clustering significantly improves performance for large head: For every published notification, the publisher and all subnumbers of subscriptions.
scribers forming them into several prefix matching problems. The notifications are encrypted by using prefix-preserving encryption.
Matching is reduced to checking whether an encrypted notification contains one of the desired prefixes. This scheme has To the best of our knowledge, this is the first complete and distinguishable notifications and is not secure according to our secure solution for C-CBPS that has been presented in the lit-model. Although it can be modified to have computationally erature. We split the related work section in three parts: work indistinguishable notifications, the modified scheme still leaks more information than necessary (due to prefix matching) and 1, 1988. proposed by Srivatsa et al. [27] . Confidential CBPS is only sup-[10] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson, "Tor: The secondported for equality matches through the direct use ofpseudorangeneration onion router", in Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security dom functions and is not secure according to our model. Symposium, 2004. 
